Something far bigger than anyone expected. We call these companies Model Busters. Great name. Model busters either reveal a market that's much larger than anticipated or expand into new product lines so effectively that they break out of their original category entirely. We're talking about model busters now because we believe AI is creating many more of them. AI will may be the defining platform shift of our time. It's changing how products are built, how they're distributed, and how buying decisions get made. It's creating new consumer experiences, new workflows, and entirely new business models. Platform shifts often create new winners. AI is no exception. Today's most ambitious companies will grow faster and become bigger than anything we've seen before. Example here, if you were an investor modeling out Figma in the early days and you thought it would always be a design tool. Again, this is not how Dylan was pitching the business. But if you thought it was going to be a design tool, you could simply look and see, all right, how many designers are in the world. And if you could get 5%, 10%, 20% of them using it, would this be a big company? Still would have been a big company, but wouldn't have been a $50 billion public company, most likely. And it ultimately kind of like broke out of that TAM by being collaboration tool across, you know, across entire companies. We should have David back on. I really enjoyed talking to him during Andreessen LP day. I do wonder, like, is it a tautology that a model buster cannot be modeled? Like, are we talking about an ineffable quality that cannot be defined? Like, is there a pattern for finding model busters? Because the, like, definitionally, the model busters are things that cannot be modeled. It's funny because he's also on the growth team and it probably does like the most modeling of anyone at Anderson. Well, Roblox is an example. So Roblox had, has 20, 20.6 million DAUs in the US and Canada last quarter. Yeah. And there's, I think that I don't know how many people, young people under, under 18 there are in Canada, but in the US it's like something like 70 million. And so that is like a meaning. Like, if you were, if you were evaluating Roblox and saying like, more than a quarter of people under the age of 18 are gonna be playing this game every single day by 2025, you would have sounded a little bit crazy because I don't know that there's that many video games that I don't know how many video games have ever achieved that level. Of daily active usage in a cohort like that. Video games in general have been like a model buster in the sense that people were expecting it to be comped to the film industry. And I believe the video game industry is like an order of magnitude bigger than the film ent television industry. It is a significant expansion of growth. But my question about like, how much time should you spend trying to codify model busters or should it just be something that we refer to looking backwards? Because my question is like, if you go back and you look at Danny Reimer in the seed series A of Figma or Mamoon at KP doing the B or Andrew Reed doing the C, like at what point did it become important to win that deal to identify Figma as a model buster versus just say the metrics are really good. Dylan Field's a killer. I'm investing on that. And then yes, maybe there's a second act. But if I get a bunch of those ultra high quality entrepreneur, ultra high quality product, ultra high quality KPIs, I'm good enough. And I don't even need to really predict that this will, you know, have a second act or expand out and the TAM will moon. Like it's not. And you could see the same thing about like, you know, Andrew Palmer lucky. Like you just look at the team and like the market's big enough to justify the investment in that phase and then you just keep doubling down and then it busts your model. But you're in it for different reasons. You're not in it because you predicted the model would be bust. So I wonder what it teaches you about like the philosophy of early stage investing. Yeah. I mean I think you could have, you could have underwrote SpaceX for a long time, ignoring, ignoring the opportunity for Starlink. Right. And it still probably be, it'd be interesting to see, you know how when. That made it into its first deck. Yeah. Like its first model. Yeah. Probably 10 years into the business, I have to imagine it was not in any of the series A through C. People are like, I thought I was investing in a rocket ship company, Accidentally. Invested in an Internet company. Internet company. The accidental Internet company. Again and again and again. The Internet is the category and that every company.